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ABSTRACT 
  
 
 
Boards of directors are key governance mechanisms in organizations and fulfil two 
main tasks: monitoring managers and firm performance, and providing advice and access to 
resources. In spite of a wealth of research much remains unknown about how boards attend to 
the two tasks. This study investigates whether organizational (firm profitability) and 
environmental factors (industry regulation) affect board tasks performance. The data combine 
CEOs’ responses to a questionnaire, and archival data from a sample of large Italian firms. 
Findings show that past firm performance is negatively associated with board monitoring and 
advice tasks; greater industry regulation enhances perceived board tasks performance; board 
monitoring and advice tasks tend to reinforce each other, despite their theoretical and practical 
distinction. 
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Integrating Agency and Resource Dependence Theory: 
Firm Profitability, Industry Regulation, and Board Tasks Performance 
 
1. Introduction  
The roaring collapses of highly profitable firms like Enron and Parmalat in the early 
2000s sounded as corporate governance paradoxes: their boards were composed of prominent 
and knowledgeable managers, academics and professional, and ticked all the boxes of the best 
governance practices. Nonetheless, they filed for bankruptcy with multi-billionaire losses for 
their shareholders, bondholders, workers and the society at large (Coffee, 2005). These cases 
cast doubts on the collective understanding of what boards do, prompting numerous calls to 
move beyond the demographics and provide a systematic analysis of board behaviour (Dalton, 
Hitt, Certo & Dalton, 2007).  
Despite the wealth of research on boards of directors, there is still a quest for a deeper 
understanding of what drives board task performance (Huse, 2007). Boards are expected to 
perform two tasks: monitoring managers and firm performance, and providing advice and 
access to resources (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Prior studies explaining board monitoring or 
advice tasks rely upon board composition (Le, Walters & Kroll, 2006), or micro-level 
determinants - as board processes and cognitive conflicts - (Forbes & Milliken, 1999), and 
macro-level factors (Minichilli, Zattoni, Nielsen & Huse, 2012). In almost all instances, 
researchers analyse monitoring and advice tasks separately. More recently the literature 
highlights the need to move beyond this “static view”, integrating the two perspectives 
underlying board monitoring (Agency theory) and advice (Resource Dependence theory) 
tasks (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). This is further reinforced by Ocasio’ s attention-based view 
(ABV), suggesting that decision-making bodies as the board of directors do not constantly 
engage in all activities, “but place different emphasis on their tasks according to the various 
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issues and answers they focus on” (1997: 188). Ocasio indicates that boards’ engagement into 
the different tasks depends on the contextual conditions boards and organizations are 
embedded into (Ocasio & Joseph, 2005), thus sparking a number of studies using a 
contingency approach to boards (Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2010). 
Building on these perspectives, this study seeks to empirically assess whether past 
firm performance and industry regulation affect board monitoring and advice tasks. The data 
are drawn from a sample of Italian largest companies, whose CEOs responded to a detailed 
questionnaire. Findings are in line with prior works indicating that board demography does 
not affect board monitoring and advice tasks (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003), and in addition 
show that past performance is negatively associated with board monitoring and advice, 
whereas greater industry regulation enhances both tasks.  
This study enhances understanding of how boards operate: first, by providing evidence 
of the effects of past firm performance on board monitoring and advice tasks, whereas most of 
the existing literature is concerned with the effects of board behaviour on the subsequent 
performance. Second, by showing that greater industry regulation increases a board’s 
attention towards monitoring and advice tasks. Third, by suggesting that despite the different 
theoretical underpinnings, and distinct measurement construct, board monitoring and advice 
tasks are strongly correlated (boards that are perceived to monitor tend to be considered active 
in their advice task as well).  
These findings have implications for practice: the literature does not posit the 
dichotomous view of the board as monitor versus advisor; rather, researchers posit boards to 
be either active in the two tasks or less engaged overall. A more general concern arises with 
boards in high performing firms: according to the findings these are reluctant to perform the 
expected tasks; ultimately, there is a potential threat for high performing firms that board hold 
back, thus imposing higher vigilance on boards’ engagement. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section two illustrates the 
theoretical background and derives hypotheses.  Section three follows a description of the 
sampling procedure and the method. Section four reports the findings before discussing 
implications for theory and practice. Section five concludes with the limitations and possible 
avenues for future research. 
 
2. Board Tasks Performance 
Board tasks performance is defined as the “board’s ability to perform its control and 
service tasks effectively” (Forbes & Milliken, 1999: 493). These tasks refer to the activities a 
board performs to comply with regulation and shareholders’ expectations. The two tasks are 
theoretically distinct and are made up of different activities. Board monitoring is rooted into 
agency theory (AT) (Fama & Jensen, 1983): boards are expected to monitor activities and 
decisions in order to ensure shareholders’ interests are met. The watchdog function is 
amplified in the case of separation between ownership and control, that is, when managers do 
not bear a major stake of wealth effects of their decisions (Coffee, 2005). However, the legal 
nature of the board imposes monitoring as a primary task for the board regardless the 
organizational forms (Bainbridge, 2002): directors are required to oversee a firm’s activities 
as a part of their “duty of care” towards the company and all key stakeholders (Blair, 2012). 
Beside the monitoring task, resource dependence theory (RDT) proposes that boards 
provide access to resources that are not otherwise available (Pfeffer & Salancick, 1978); RDT 
sees boards as asset of the firm contributing to sustained value creation (Hillman, Withers & 
Collins, 2009). The advice or resource provision task includes advice on strategic initiatives, 
an active involvement in decision-making, and follow-up on strategic choices.  
The two tasks stem from different theoretical traditions, suggesting a stylized model of 
what boards (should) do, and how to enhance monitoring and advice respectively. The 
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distinction affects both researchers’ understanding of boards, and a firm’ search for good 
directors: board monitoring emphasize directors’ independence and ability to challenge 
managers who are not acting in the best interests of stakeholders; board advice envisions that 
board capital is a key factor in enhancing advice and resource provision (Sundaramurthy & 
Lewis, 2003).  
The theoretical distinction underlying the two tasks and its implications in terms of 
regulatory provisions and expected board behaviour shapes the development of research. 
Traditionally governance scholars explored how board composition impacts on firm or board 
tasks performance (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003). The so-called “usual suspects” (board 
independence and size, CEO duality, board ownership) account for a limited part in 
explaining board tasks performance (Forbes & Milliken, 1999), whilst board processes, 
cognitive conflicts and effort norms are better predictors of engagement (Minichilli, et al., 
2012). Studies on boards of directors downplay the role of firm or context specific conditions 
on board behaviour (Bamberger, 2008), and the numerous calls for additional research 
overcoming these limitations have only received partial fulfilment (Dalton & Dalton, 2011).  
Ocasio (1997) offers an alternative view and challenges the idea of boards being 
constantly involved into their tasks: the ABV proposes that boards, as all decision making 
bodies, selectively choose where to address their efforts. Such selectivity is due to time 
constraint and prioritization, board members’ bounded rationality and limitation in 
information gathering, thus impairing boards’ ability to perform their tasks. The work of 
Hillman, and Dalziel (2003) and Sundaramurthy, and Lewis (2003) further develops this view, 
highlighting the paradox of control and collaboration within board of directors, and proposes 
an integration of the two views. The application of ABV to the understanding of decision–
making bodies is yet more profound: Ocasio identifies patterns to ascertain how boards 
distribute and regulate their attention to their tasks (focus of attention) through the 
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development of the concept of situated attention. What tasks boards focus on, and what they 
do, depends on the specific context or situation they find themselves in (1997:188). Barnett 
(2008) provides additional theoretical backing to this stream of research, indicating that board 
configurations and actions are highly dependent on the set of internal and external conditions 
that firms face. 
Recent empirical works support these intuitions: Tuggle, and colleagues (2010) find 
significant variation in how boards prioritize board monitoring according to changing 
profitability. Zhang (2010) explores the board transitioning between information seeking and 
strategic actions, when process-based conditions vary. Yu, Engelman, and Van den Ven 
(2005) build on ABV and observe how organizational structure influences aspects of the 
merger integration process managers attended to over time. 
 
2.1 Firm profitability and board tasks performance 
This study investigates the effects of firm and industry characteristics on board 
monitoring and advice tasks. With respect to boards’ allocation of attention to monitoring and 
advice tasks, firm performance and industry regulation are considered as relevant factors 
(Boyd, Haynes, Hitt, Bergh & Ketchen, 2012): first, past and current firm performance matter 
because of the use by directors as a means to assess managerial effectiveness (Walsh & 
Seward, 1990). Second, industry regulation matters to boards because of the emphasis on 
interactions, compliance to norms and resource provisions required, conditional on the 
different levels of regulation (Cho & Hambrick, 2006).  
Past firm performance influences boards’ engagement into monitoring and advice 
tasks. This is consistent with evidence of a bi-directional relationship of firm performance and 
governance structures (Platt & Platt, 2012): the board and CEO affect firm performance, but 
profitability also affects them. However, while boards’ effects on subsequent firm 
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performance have received wide attention (Pugliese, Bezemer, Zattoni, Huse, van Den Bosch 
& Volberda, 2009), the impact of past and current performance on board tasks is not fully 
exploited.  
Firm profitability is generally employed to assess how well (or poorly) executives 
operate. A few studies subvert this logic by exploring how firm profitability affects board 
composition and structure (Gales & Kesner, 1994; Mueller & Barker, 1997). These examine 
extreme cases of bankruptcy, showing that negative returns often lead to changes in board and 
leadership structures (Daily, 1995). This study takes a different stand and posits that boards in 
high (low) performing firms behave differently in relation to their focus on monitoring and 
advice tasks. To our knowledge, no study has investigated whether past and current 
profitability affects boards’ monitoring or advice tasks. 
In poorly performing firms, boards are supposed to be active monitors. This role is 
fully consistent with predictions of AT indicating that the substitution of poorly performing 
managers is one of the mechanisms in place to ensure shareholders’ interests are met (Walsh 
& Seward, 1990). Poor performing firms require a more vigilant approach from their boards: 
managers who caused the poor performance should be evaluated, and fired, if necessary. This 
is also backed by a legal perspective: directors of distressed firms are more likely to engage in 
monitoring activities, reducing the threat of litigation due to a breach in their duty of care 
towards shareholders (Bainbridge, 2002). 
The resource dependence theory (RDT) suggests that boards act primarily as providers 
of resources that are lacking internally, adjusting their behaviour to organizational and 
environmental contingencies (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Limited empirical evidence shows 
that past performance affects board’s advice task (Boyd, 1995). When firms experience 
impaired performance, the board will search for organizationally relevant gains from 
operating both inside and outside the board and revisit the firm strategic direction 
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(Geletkanycz & Boyd, 2011). In addition, boards are required to securing access to valuable 
resources (Boeker & Goodstein, 1991): as part of the advice task, boards support the CEO and 
the executive team in making informed choices about future directions and subvert current 
conditions (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). 
HP1a: Poor firm performance associates positively with board monitoring and advice 
tasks. 
 
Whereas both a theoretical rationale and early empirical evidence show that poor 
performance triggers board monitoring and advice, little is known about board behaviour in 
high performing firms (Daily, et al., 2003). The dearth of studies is due in part to the nature of 
governance theories calling for a board’s action only when things go bad (Coffee, 2005). A 
commonly assumed assumption is that boards of directors in profitable firms are discharged 
from tight monitoring responsibilities: “if there is nothing broken, there is no need for fixing 
it” (Leblanc & Gilles, 2005:175). Wesphal, and Zajac (1995, 1998, 2001) attribute this to a 
great degree of symbolism in the Board-TMT relationship: CEOs of well performing firms are 
less subject to monitoring and scrutiny and their choices find generally large consensus. 
Tuggle, et al, (2010) find that negative deviation from prior performance increases a board’s 
attention to monitoring, while positive deviation reduces it.  
At a more general level, this perspective is consistent with the evidence that the 
probability of disciplinary actions of the boards is more pronounced in the case of poor 
performance (Baghat & Bolton, 2008). This suggests that (independent) boards are more 
prone to refrain from monitoring if they consider firm performance to be satisfactorily. 
Turning attention to board advice in high-performing firms, Ocasio (1997) describes how 
decision-makers’ cognition of the current status of a corporation fosters a transition between 
tasks. Profitable firms require more attention towards new investments and opportunities and 
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the main challenge posed on directors is shifting into expansion and increasing productivity; 
directors reduce their emphasis on financial control and monitoring activities, focusing their 
attention towards the achievement of a company’ s growth objectives (Hillman, 2005). Boards 
in successful companies tend to emphasize the pursuit of new strategic initiatives and 
ventures thus reducing the control function (Lynall, Golden & Hillman, 2003).  
HP1b: High firm performance associates negatively with board monitoring task and 
positively with board advice task. 
 
2.2 Industry regulation and board tasks performance 
Government policy, regulation and enforcement are major forces in the business 
environment. Firms deal with environmental features such as industry regulation and 
uncertainty that shape boards’ search for external legitimacy and resource provision (Boyd, 
1990). Pfeffer (1972) asserts that a board reflects the firm’s external dependencies. 
Governance scholars extensively rely upon his view and suggest that boards develop as 
efficient responses to the firm’s environment (Abebe, Angriawan & Liu, 2011). Industry 
characteristics are among the major forces shaping companies’ structures, top-management 
teams and boards of directors (Dess & Beard, 1984). Research shows that uncertainty, level of 
competition and regulation affect board size, outsider ratio, and interlocks (Boyd, 1995). Also, 
shifts in the regulatory or technological environment cause important changes in board 
composition and leadership structure (Hillman, Cannella & Paetzold, 2000).  
Nevertheless, extant studies do not explore the effects of industry regulation on board 
monitoring and advice tasks. Firms operating in regulated industries are subject to compliance 
to strict norms and rules affecting various areas of a corporation’s life (e.g. production, 
accountability and reporting, pricing and level of employment). Regulators view board 
oversight as complementary to supervision, and boards become the mechanism through which 
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compliance and accountability are ensured (Adams & Ferreira, 2008). This is consistent with 
the “regulatory pressure hypothesis” suggesting that board monitoring is heightened in highly 
regulated industries (Becher & Frye, 2011). Hagendorff, Collins, and Keasey (2010) find that 
such complementarity exists in the banking sector in a sample of 13 countries. Also, Becher, 
and Frye (2011)’s study of IPOs documents lower board monitoring after industry 
deregulation in multiple sectors. In addition a firm’s ability to compete in the market is related 
to the fulfilment of what is required of regulators and legislation imposing the supervision of 
a company’s operations in order to avoid incurring in sanctions and litigation costs (Millstein 
& MacAvoy, 1998): this is witnessed by Pfeffer’s findings that boards tend to appoint 
directors with legal expertise in regulated industries in order to reduce threats of litigation 
(1972).  
Also, regulation restricts some of the strategic options available and most of the 
decision-making and planning functions are shifted away from a firm’s managers and boards 
to public officials that choose profitability levels and intensity of competition (Lang & 
Lockhart, 1990). Strategic alternatives are only partially left to the managers: if not entirely, 
major strategic initiatives require negotiation or approval of the regulatory body. HP2a: 
Greater industry regulation associates positively with board monitoring task, and negatively 
with board advice task. 
On the other hand, firms operating in less regulated and open to competition industries 
face different types of challenges: the lack of regulation reduces the attention towards 
monitoring, thus alleviating the board from the monitoring function (Boyd, 1995). At the 
same time they experience a more direct control over key factors affecting performance. In 
such industries the level of competition, the difficulty to foresee the future of the sector, and 
the threat of newcomers enhance uncertainty (Lang & Lockhart, 1990): firms struggle to 
adapt to the continuous and sudden changes within the industry that might be outside of their 
 10
control, and directors are required to act as providers of resources that are lacking internally 
(Hillman, 2005). In order to increase their proximity to key resources, firms tend to empower 
directors to bring in valuable resources, and to guarantee a company’ success and growth. A 
board needs to fill in the gap with subjects whose choices are likely to affect firm’s 
positioning and competitive advantage (Hillman, et al., 2000). RDT posits that this role is 
enhanced through directors with superior knowledge of the rules, being able to advise 
managers in taking decisions and build sustained competitive advantage. 
The shift from monitoring towards more of an entrepreneurial orientation is shown by 
Cho, and Hambrick (2006) in the context of a deregulation in the US airline industry in the 
1980s, when directors (and managers) switched their attention from meeting regulators’ 
requirements toward the search for new profitable niches.  
HP2b: Lower industry regulation associates negatively with board monitoring task, 
and positively with board advice task. 
 
3. Methods 
3.1 Sample selection and data collection 
The data were gathered through a questionnaire addressed to the CEOs of the top 
2,000 Italian companies, ranked by turnover, at the end of 2004. Previous research on boards 
of directors shows that a low response rate (below 20%) is still acceptable: board members 
are busy professionals and are reluctant to reveal private information despite confidentiality 
and secrecy agreements in place. In order to increase the response rate, we followed three 
steps in designing of the survey: a pre-test with 12 executives fine-tuned the language and 
content of questions. The questionnaire included a presentation letter detailing the main 
purpose of the study. A reminder was sent out to the non-responding firms three months after 
the first round. At the end of the data collection process we received 264 valid responses, with 
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a 13% overall response rate, which is consistent with previous studies (Finkelstein, Hambrick 
& Cannella, 2009).  
While the cover letter ensured confidentiality and anonymity in revealing the data only 
in aggregate form (Posdakoff, MacKenzie, Lee & Posdakoff, 2003), companies needed to be 
identifiable to allow researchers matching primary data with archival, accounting-based 
information. Financial data from 2001-2004 were collected through ORBIS, a widely used 
database providing a wealth of financial and governance information about the companies.  
OLS regressions are employed to test hypotheses. The joint use of archival and survey 
data with temporal lags minimizes effects of common method variance (Payne, Benson & 
Finegold, 2009). The Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test is employed to check for 
selection bias, and compared responding to non-responding firms. Results suggest that the 
two sub-samples of responding and non-responding companies are not significantly different 
across several dimensions: industry representation, company size, profitability and age, 
family ownership.  
The only difference refers to the “listing status”: 25% of firms included in the final 
sample are listed entities, while they account for 13% of the initial population. This is not 
likely to affect the results as a considerable portion of non-listed firms is in the final sample, 
and a control for the listing status is included in the models. Lastly, to ensure rigor and 
increase significance of the analyses, observations with missing data on dependent variables 
were handled by listwise deletion: “missing data were identified if respondents had omitted to 
answer on any single items referring to the construct of monitoring and advice tasks”.  
 
The Italian setting 
Italy is an appropriate setting to conduct research on boards of directors: first, since a 
decade the Italian regulators engaged into a great debate that resulted into increasing pressure 
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on board scrutiny (Enriques & Volpin, 2007). Second, the Italian corporate governance 
system resembles other systems (i.e. France, Spain, Portugal) in Europe as well as in Asia that 
are characterized by a weak disciplining role of capital markets and a stronger reliance upon 
internal governance mechanisms (De Jong, 1997). Italian corporations are legally required to 
have a board of directors who is appointed by the general shareholders’ assembly. All 
companies have a statutory board and in the vast majority of the cases, companies would rely 
upon an external auditor to verify compliance of financial statements to accounting standards. 
Listed companies are subjected to oversight by the market regulator (CONSOB, the 
equivalent of US SEC) who issued in 1999 and 2002 a version of the “code of best practice”. 
The code is widely adopted and represents a benchmark also among large non-listed 
companies; this increased homogeneity in governance practices, including higher 
transparency in the appointment of directors, larger proportion of independent, and the 
adoption of board committees aligns Italian corporate law to the majority of regulation in 
developed countries (Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008). 
 
Dependent Variables: measures of board monitoring and advice tasks 
The two dependent variables are computed through multiple items measured in the 
questionnaire survey on a 5-point Likert scale. CEOs were asked to rate multiple items that 
relate to the two main concepts (latent constructs). The dependent variables are perceptual 
measures of board monitoring and advice tasks (Knockaert & Ucbasaran, 2013).  Perceptual 
measures are often used to measure board roles (Nicholson & Newton, 2010; Stevenson & 
Radin, 2009; van Den Heuvel, van Gils & Voordeckers, 2006) and more generally in the 
entrepreneurial domain.  
Further, Lyon, Lumpkin, and Dess suggest that “one potential advantage of perceptual 
approaches is a relatively high level of validity because researchers can pose questions that 
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address directly the underlying nature of a construct” (2000: 1058). Also, they highlight the 
relevance of the data-source: these measures come from the most knowledgeable individual in 
the organization, and enhance their fit with the investigated concepts. Nevertheless, given the 
difficulty in capturing multi-dimensional concepts as in the form of monitoring and advice 
tasks, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is employed to reduce multi-items variables into 
single and clearly identifiable factors (Hair, Black, Babin & Anderson, 2010: 99). This 
technique is extensively used in corporate governance research because of the specific 
features of the field, where hardly any single item or measure is an exhaustive proxy for the 
underlying concept to be measured (Larcker & Rusticus, 2010).  
The questionnaire includes nine items referring to various activities in which a board 
engages; in order to minimize the risk of “serial answers” and “social desirability bias”, the 
items are inserted at different places in the questionnaire. The EFA confirms the existence of 
two main factors (eigenvalue > 1), and that the questionnaire items and latent constructs are 
consistent with existing theories and measures in different contexts (van Ees, van Der Laan & 
Postma, 2008).  
The two main constructs resulting from EFA are identifiable as CEOs’ perception of 
board monitoring and advice tasks. All factors have acceptable loading scores on each 
component of the latent construct, indicating a high association with the latent construct itself 
(Zhang, 2010): the variable “monitoring task” is the mean of three items. CEOs rated the 
extent to which the board: keeps itself informed about financial position of the firm; oversees 
that the operations are properly enacted; and monitors the CEO (Cronbach’ α = .781). The 
variable “advice” is the mean of four items about the different aspects a board is expected to 
contribute to. CEOs rated the extent to which the board: provides advice to the management; 
discusses alternative options; takes strategic decisions; and supervises all strategic phases 
(Cronbach’ α = .832). Measuring CEOs’ perception of board monitoring and advice, rather 
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than actual task performance, raises potential concerns related to the self-attribution bias (i.e. 
the CEOs could downplay board’s contribution because of their status and power, or even 
unintentionally).  
In the attempt to minimize these concerns, we test whether CEOs’ perception of board 
monitoring and advice is affected by potential proxies for CEO power and influence: CEO 
tenure and age, or by the overall number of interlocks within the business group. Correlation 
analysis (Table 1 Panel B) shows that there are no significant patterns in the data: CEO age, 
tenure and interlocks do not correlate with CEOs’ perception of monitoring or advice tasks. 
Hence, we rule out the risk that CEOs’ assessment of board task performance is affected by 
power or self-attribution.  
 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Independent and Control Variables 
The two main predictors of board tasks performance are firm past performance and 
industry regulation. The data for the two variables were drawn from archives and the survey. 
“Past firm performance” (profit) is the average Return on Equity (ROE) in the three years 
preceding the administration of the questionnaire (2001 to 2003). ROE is the most relevant 
figure from the equity-holders’ perspective, whom boards pay attention to, and it is used as an 
overall profitability measure for corporations capturing both operating and financial results 
(Shen & Lin, 2009; Brick & Chidambaran, 2010). This study primarily relies on data from 
financial statements: first, for the sake of comparability, accounting measures are employed to 
assess firm performance because the sample includes both listed and unlisted companies; 
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second, stock market based performance are susceptible of investors’ anticipation and the risk 
of suffering a downward bias due to the observation period (Baghat & Bolton, 2008). In order 
to test the effects of performance on board monitoring or advice tasks, the sample is 
partitioned into quintiles (Ramdani & van Witteloostuijn, 2010), and identified firms whose 
profitability falls within the first (h_prof) or the last quintile (l_prof). An industry-adjusted 
measure of ROE is also employed: this is computed as the average ROE (2001-2003) of the 
relevant Firmi minus the average ROE of its industry (identified through the ATECO codes). 
The analyses – untabulated in the paper – confirm our results. 
“Industry regulation” (ind_reg) indicates whether a firm operates within a sector that 
is subject to government regulation. This is measured by asking CEOs whether the firm is 
subjected to a highly regulated environment (5 on a 5-point scale) or not (1 on a 5-point scale). 
Three main reasons justify the use of this metric over a dummy variable at industry level 
(regulated versus non-regulated): first, industries cannot be classified as regulated or not 
regulated with a clear-cut criterion (King & Lenox, 2000). There are different levels of 
regulation between the two extremes (e.g. free competition and regulation); some industries 
might be only partially regulated: the food industry is subject to health regulation and quality 
checks on the products, while in the construction and manufacturing health and safety are a 
primary concern. Others instead, like public utilities are regulated even in terms of fares, 
employment levels, dividend policies and strategic choices. Another reason is the superior 
knowledge of the CEO in assessing whether the main industry in which a company operates is 
more or less regulated: this is particularly relevant in a sample that includes conglomerates 
operating in different industries with varying levels of regulation. A third reason is strictly 
related to the research design of this study: using a scaled measure for industry regulation, 
allows discriminating between firms operating in highly regulated or non-regulated industries 
and benchmark them with the rest of the population.  
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In order to check whether CEOs’ indications are reliable, CEOs’ responses are 
matched to the traditional classification of regulated versus non-regulated industries. The 
study employs the ATECO codes and classification from 2002 to cluster firms in their 
respective industries. We found 13 main industries at a two-digit code level. Spearman’ index 
shows a high overlap between the two (.28 at 0.01 level) suggesting that the measure is a 
reliable proxy. In addition, we checked that firms operating in regulated (or non-regulated) 
industries had lower (higher) Return on Asset (ROA) and Return on Sales (ROS) standard 
deviation in the years from 2001 until 2003. Results show that firms operating in highly 
regulated industries have lower variance in operating profits, thus suggesting they are more 
predictable, which is a feature of regulated environments. Lastly, to perform our analyses, a 
series of dummies identify firms operating in highly regulated industries (h_ind_reg) or in 
low regulated ones (l_ind_reg). 
A number of control variables are employed in this study: they refer to firm and board 
features. Four different firm-level attributes are taken into account: Firm Size (size) is 
computed as the logarithmic transformation of the average turnover in 2001-2003. Family 
ownership (fam) is a dummy variable indicating whether one family holds at least 30% of 
shares (1), or not (0). The listing status (listed) of corporations is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the company has been consistently listed during the three years prior to the study (1), 
or not (0). The institutional ownership (inst_own) is also included because of the potential 
disciplining function on the board of directors’ monitoring or advice tasks: the variable sums 
up the total percentage of shares held by the banks, mutual funds and venture capitalists. 
A number of board-level controls are included: CEO duality (CEO_dual) indicates 
whether the CEO is also the Chairperson of the board (1), or not (0). This is an important 
feature and alters the dynamics between the top management team and outside directors 
(Boyd, 1995). The size of the board (bd_size) is a continuous variable winsorized at 95% 
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value to reduce the impact of extreme values: three firms have more than 25 board members 
and three less than 2; in order to keep the observations within the sample, these are attributed 
to the top (bottom) values of the distribution at 5 and 95 percentage. Board independence 
(bd_outs) is calculated as the ratio of independent, unaffiliated and non-executive directors 
sitting on the board over the total number of directors. Directors’ ownership (bd_own) 
indicates the ratio of directors with shares in the company over the total number of directors. 
Board regulation (bd_reg) is a dummy variable based on the CEO’s indication about whether 
the board has formal regulation in place suggesting how it must operate (1), or not (0). This is 
a relevant feature in board research (Brick & Chidambaran, 2010) as it is likely to put 
restrictions or enable a board’ s ability in performing its key tasks. Board meeting (bd_meet) 
is the number of meetings held by the board during the year prior to the survey. This variable 
is winsorized at 95% because two firms had more than 20 meetings in a year and five only 
one: to keep the observations within the sample, these were attributed to the top (bottom) 
values of the distribution at 5 and 95 percentage. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
4. Results 
Descriptive statistics and univariate analyses 
The descriptive statistics in Table 2 indicate that boards have on average 7 members, 
CEO duality is not a common practice (30.7%), and seldom boards regulate the way they 
operate (33.3%). A number of tests are performed to check for potential differences between 
listed versus non-listed firms and between family-firms versus non-family firms across a 
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series of dimensions. Results from independent sample t-test confirm some differences 
between listed and non-listed companies: listed companies tend to have larger boards (9.36) 
with more outsiders (66%). The t-test shows significant differences between family and non-
family firms: FFs have smaller boards, spend less time in formal board meetings than non-
family peers, and tend to operate in non-regulated industries. 
Table 3 displays correlations coefficients for all variables employed. Both Spearman 
and Pearson coefficients are reported due to the presence of several dummy variables (Hair, et 
al., 2010). The correlation analysis shows mostly expected results. Larger boards tend to have 
higher number of outsiders, and meet more frequently. CEOs’ perception of board monitoring 
is enhanced in listed corporations, and correlates positively to board size and outsider ratio. 
Results also suggest that monitoring is negatively correlated with higher firm performance, 
whilst it is positively associated with industry regulation. CEOs’ perception of board advice 
increases in listed and family firms, whilst it is not correlated to any of the structural 
dimensions of the board. The number of board meetings positively correlates to both tasks. 
Furthermore, the correlation among monitoring and resource provision tasks is particularly 
high (0.51; p<0.01), suggesting that boards are active in the two tasks at the same time (van 
Den Heuvel, et al., 2006). These results are in line with findings from previous studies, thus 
increasing confidence in the suitability of the sample for the purpose of this study. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Multivariate Analyses 
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Tables 4 & 5 present the results of multivariate analyses. A three-step regression is 
employed for each of the two dependent variables. This is consistent with other studies on 
boards of directors (Machold, Huse, Minichilli & Nordqvist, 2011; Payne, et al., 2009), and 
enables capturing the additional variance explained when adding a new group of variables to 
the previous model. In both cases, Model 1 in Tables 4 & 5 reports the results for control 
variables only. Model 2 and 3 present respectively the effects of firm performance and 
industry regulation on board monitoring and advice. Model 4 reports the full model with 
controls, industry regulation and past firm performance. Variance inflation factors (VIFs) and 
linear dependency tests are performed in order to check for multicollinearity. None of the 
VIFs approach the critical threshold of 10, with the highest score approaching 2. 
Model 1 in Table 4 indicates that firm and board level characteristics are not 
significantly associated with board monitoring. The only notable exception is the listing status 
of the corporation (0.57, p<0.01). This result is in line with existing theory and empirical 
findings (Payne, et al., 2009): boards in listed companies face higher pressure in performing 
their monitoring activities than their non-listed peers. Model 1 in Table 5 reports similar 
results: listing status (0.31, p<0.05), family ownership (.31, p<05) and board regulation (0.28, 
p<0.05) enhance CEO’s perception of board advice. Models 2, 3 and 4 are relevant to our 
hypotheses.  
Model 2 (Table 4) tests the effect of past firm performance on the board monitoring, 
and focus on the most and least profitable firms (the top and bottom quintiles respectively). 
Past firm performance is significantly associated with board monitoring: when running a 
piecewise regression with dummies for high (low) performance, results show that CEOs 
perceive board monitoring to be higher in poorly performing firms (.44, p<0.05), while it is 
lower in high performing firms (-.58, p< 0.01). When examining the effects of past firm 
performance on the board advice, Model 2 (Table 5) shows somewhat similar and less 
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pronounced results. Past firm performance affects board advice: results show that in highly 
performing firms boards tend to reduce their advice task (-0.36, p<0.10), while there is a 
positive, yet not statistically significant association with for poorly performing companies 
(.18, p>.10). 
These results substantially support Hp1a suggesting that poorly performing firms are 
positively associated with board monitoring and advice task. Results provide only partial 
support to Hp1b and show that higher (past) firm performance significantly reduces board 
monitoring as well as board advice. 
Model 3 in Table 4 illustrates the impact of industry regulation on the CEOs’ 
perception of board monitoring. Two dummies are employed to capturing whether the firm 
operates into a highly or non-regulated industry. Results reveal that boards of companies 
operating in highly regulated industries are perceived to perform a monitoring task (0.39, 
p<0.01), while in non-regulated sectors, the result is not statistically significant (.03, p>.10). 
When turning attention to the impact of industry regulation on the CEOs’ perception of board 
advice, Model 3 (Table 5) shows that greater industry regulation will also enhance board 
advice (0.56, p<0.01). These results provide partial support to Hp2a. When looking at firms 
operating in non-regulated industries, results are not significant with regard to both tasks: 
hence, we reject Hp2b positing a positive relation between low industry regulation and board 
advice (.06, p>.10), and a negative relationship with board monitoring (.03, p>.10). 
Model 4 (Table 4 & 5) supports our hypothesis: when testing the full model for 
monitoring and advice tasks, both industry regulation and past firm performance are 
associated with CEOs’ perception of board monitoring and advice. The full model shows in 
both cases a higher explanatory power in terms of monitoring (R2 =0.185) and advice (R2 
=0.141) tasks.  
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--------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLES 4 & 5 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
Robustness Checks 
In order to assess the sensitivity of the main results to the use of alternative 
specifications and analyses, a series of additional tests are performed. All tests employ the full 
model (Model 4) as a benchmark. 
The first concern is the potential for endogeneity or reverse causality in the model. 
This issue is quite common in governance studies (Baghat & Bolton, 2008), and we tried to 
address it in a number of ways. First, the study employs lagged performance measures (up to 
three years prior to the administration of the survey) as predictors of board monitoring and 
advice tasks. This attenuates the risk that board activism in 2004 might have “caused” firm 
performance in 2001, 2002 and 2003. Second, the possibility of endogeneity being caused by 
omitted variables is ruled out by including a number of control variables that are likely to 
affect both CEO’s perception of board monitoring and advice and firm performance (Chenhall 
& Moers, 2007): CEO duality, board size, outsider ratio, directors’ ownership, board 
regulation and number of meetings. Hence, the risk of having biased and inconsistent 
coefficient estimates is minimized (Wooldridge, 2000). Furthermore, a formal test for the 
presence of omitted variables is performed by re-running the two full models with monitoring 
and advice tasks as dependent variables, and employing the post-estimation commands “estat 
ovtest” and “linktest” in STATA (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010: 92): in all cases we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis “H0: the model has no omitted variables” as the |Prob>F| is always non 
significant with the minimum value approaching .687. Third, the potential threat of 
simultaneity is checked by running OLS regressions where the main predictor in our model 
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(past firm performance) becomes the dependent variables while CEOs’ perception of board 
monitoring and advice become the predictors (Booth, Cornett & Tehranian, 2002). The 
regression coefficients show that both monitoring (β= .031, p=.980) and advice (β= -.405, 
p=.755) tasks do not affect firm performance. 
A second concern relates to the choice of return on equity (ROE) as a proxy for past 
firm performance; ROE captures the overall profitability of the firm and picks up firm 
leverage. In order to control for the potential effects of the capital structure, two alternative 
measures of past firm performance are employed: average return on sales (ROS) in 2001-
2003 and average return on investment (ROI) in 2001-2003. Results show that changing the 
proxy for past firm performance (either using ROS or ROI) does not substantially alter the 
findings. Table 6 displays similarity across different measures of firm performance with only 
one minor difference: the coefficient estimates on high performing firms lose their statistical 
significance but keep their economic meaning (negative sign). 
 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
A third concern arises with regard to the composition of the sample as listed and 
unlisted companies might differ in terms of board behaviour because of more (less) stringent 
regulatory requirements. Therefore separate analyses on the sub-samples of listed firms only 
and compare results with the full sample are performed. For the sake of parsimony only 
results of OLS regressions on the full models (Model 4) are presented, employing board 
monitoring and advice tasks as the dependent variables. The results show that in the sub-
sample of listed firms only (64 observations) the main effects are even more pronounced and 
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regression coefficients confirm that in high performing firms boards do not execute 
monitoring task (-1.18, p<0.01), while the effect on advice task is still negative but not 
statistically significant (-.07, p>0.10). On the other hand, boards in poorly performing firms 
enhance monitoring (.94, p<0.01). Likewise, when turning to the effects of industry regulation, 
results confirm that in highly regulated industries boards tend to be involved in monitoring 
(.46, p<0.10) and advice (.47, p<0.10). 
 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
5. Discussion 
Agency and resource-dependence theories suggest that boards are involved into 
monitoring and advice tasks (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). The two tasks constitute the core 
activities in which boards engage (Geletakanycz & Boyd, 2011). Ocasio’s “attention-based 
view” (1997) provides an appealing and theoretically sound approach to explore what boards 
do, proposing that boards emphasize board monitoring and advice tasks according to the 
contingencies they face. This study employs past performance and industry regulation as 
“contextual factors” and shows that boards change their engagement under varying 
circumstances.  
The study contributes to both theory and practice: first, it provides support to the 
“attention-based view”. Recent works by Zhang (2010), Tuggle, et al, (2010), Cho, and 
Hambrick (2006) found that boards selectively direct their attention to strategic, monitoring or 
entrepreneurial activities. We extend this line of enquiry and indicate that boards do not 
constantly engage into monitoring or advice tasks: more specifically, when turning attention 
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to the effects of past performance and industry regulation on boards’ monitoring and advice, 
changes in the contingencies above also change the way boards shift their attention to the 
tasks. The most intriguing contribution comes from an in-depth examination of the 
relationship between past profitability and board tasks performance: past firm performance 
affects boards’ involvement into monitoring and advice tasks, indicating the likelihood of 
contingencies in place. In high-performing firms, boards seem to be less engaged in both 
monitoring and advice tasks, while in poorly performing firms we find higher involvement in 
monitoring and advice tasks. This is a novel result in governance and board studies. Literature 
and previous works analyse what boards do in the case of firms facing crisis or turnaround 
situations (Daily, 1995), but very limited attention to boards in high-performing firms (Daily, 
et al., 2003). The present investigation suggests that boards pay less attention to their tasks 
when the company is performing well, thus explaining unexpected declines of very profitable 
organizations. Furthermore, results show that board monitoring and advice tasks are 
correlated and are similarly affected by firm and industry level contingencies. This is coherent 
with the idea of a paradox of control and collaboration suggested by Sundaramurthy, and 
Lewis (2003), and provides empirical support to the intuition behind Hillman, and Dalziel’s 
work (2003) proposing an integration of agency and resource-based theory.  
Industry regulation also has an effect on board tasks performance: greater industry 
regulation enhances board monitoring and advice tasks. Regulation imposes a higher degree 
of compliance to rules, standards and requirements demanded by authorities or ruling bodies, 
and boards act as complements rather than substitutes in this endeavour. The results support 
the “complementarity hypothesis” (Becher & Frye, 2011) by showing that higher regulation 
enhances board monitoring. Firms need to conform to requirements and bylaws imposed by 
regulators. The breach of regulation and failure to conform to existing rules could eventually 
result in high litigation costs and disruption in the business activities. Therefore boards are 
 25
required to exert higher monitoring and more closely follow-up of all initiatives run by the 
management (O’Donoghue, 2004). Regulation requires boards to be active in advice and 
counselling, as well as in networking activities, due to the importance of links with regulators, 
and enhancing the legitimacy and strengthening links with key players. Prior literature shows 
the importance of having boards acting as advisors and trying to influence the key actors, 
gaining access to superior information (Hillman, 2005): ultimately, these activities have 
positive outcomes in terms of performance. This opens up new perspectives in interpreting 
board dynamics and effectiveness, given that boards with similar structural features might 
present different level of engagement in the two tasks.  
The findings from this study also have practical implications. It is often questioned 
why corporations with increasing profitability may experience sudden and unexpected 
downturns (Leblanc & Gilles, 2005). Based on the evidence provided, one possible 
explanation is the lack of boards’ engagement in the expected tasks, thus reducing 
management accountability. Given the potential harm to the corporation and its shareholders, 
one main implication is to increase scrutiny and request of activism also in the case of high-
performing companies. This is somehow contrary to the expectation that boards do not engage 
much in the two tasks when the corporation is performing well: ultimately, this could turn to 
be very detrimental and disproportionately increase the power of managerial team without 
adequate control. It is well-established in the literature about symbolism (Zajac & Westphal, 
2001) that CEOs gain power over the board if the company is well-performing; however, this 
is creating a threat for the firm as boards become reluctant in carrying on their tasks.  
These results open up paths for further investigation: growing anecdotal evidence 
shows that profitable firms turn into financial distress and disgrace at an unexpected speed. It 
seems that boards are more reluctant in challenging CEOs and the top management team in 
case the latter would guarantee high levels of profits; however, albeit this is in line with an 
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agency rationale, it is also very risky. Profits might mask excessive risk-taking or short-term 
choices (cutting maintenance costs or R&D expenditures) that might be harmful in the long-
term. There are also consequences in terms of our approach to boards and governance issues: 
mainstream theories often call for increased board’s activism to protect shareholders in the 
case value maximization is at a risk (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Nevertheless, managers might 
possibly mask bad choices by artificially increasing profits, thus limiting boards’ willingness 
to oversight them. In poor performing firms we find a positive but non-significant association 
to monitoring and no relationship with resource provision task. 
    
6. Conclusions and Limitations 
Several studies have examined structural characteristics and board processes as drivers 
of board monitoring and advice (e.g. Kiel & Nicholson, 2004; Payne, et al., 2009), also in 
different institutional contexts (Minichilli, et al., 2012). However, the literature overlooked 
the role of potential contingencies (Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2010). This study explores the 
effect of past firm profitability and industry regulation on boards’ monitoring and advice tasks. 
It moves away from the idea that board activism is a function of structural features or working 
style, and hypothesizes that boards’ engagement into different tasks varies according to firm-
level and industry specific conditions. Findings show that greater industry regulation is 
positively associated with monitoring and advice, while firm profitability is negatively 
associated to both tasks. This study contributes to theory and practice. First, boards do not 
always engage in board monitoring and advice tasks, but internal (performance) and external 
(industry regulation) factors affect their behaviour. This is consistent with the predictions of 
Ocasio’s attention-based view of the firm (1997). Second, boards in a highly performing firm 
are perceived as rather passive both in monitoring and advice. Overall, boards seem reluctant 
to challenge CEOs and managers when firms are operating profitably. It would be interesting 
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investigating the reasons behind the lack of engagement and there is potential for future 
research.  
This study has a number of limitations. The study assesses board monitoring and 
advice tasks as the CEOs’ perception of board task performance, through a survey instrument. 
Despite the care in crafting the survey, wording and distribution of the items, and the number 
of tests to minimize the common method variance, there is an inherent risk of measuring 
CEOs’ perceptions of the underlying phenomena, rather than what boards actually do. Data 
triangulation and the use of multiple responses from directors on the same board would 
significantly increase the validity of the constructs. Survey data are cross-sectional, thus 
changes in board tasks performance over time as firm profitability and industry regulation 
vary cannot be tracked. 
The study draws data from a single country, Italy. Despite the similarities and 
congruence of codes and regulation with other European and Asian contexts, results might be 
context specific. Cross-country studies offer a more nuanced investigation of why this is 
likely to happen and whether boards’ responses to past firm profitability and industry 
regulation are invariant or country-specific (Minichilli, et al., 2012). The analyses span over 
post-crisis period (2001 quarters 1 to 3, according to the NBER bulletin), thus potentially 
altering firms’ and regulators’ attention towards governance issues.  
 28
 
Table 1 Panel A: Principal Component Factor Analysis and Cronbach’s Alpha 
Factor (Principal Component Analysis) Factor 
Loadings 
Alpha 
Board Monitoring Task  α=.781 
The Board keeps itself informed about the financial position of the firm .737  
The Board oversees that activities and operations are properly enacted .830  
The Board monitors the CEO .747  
   
Board Advice Task  α=.832 
The Board provides advice to the management .675  
The Board discusses alternative strategic options .882  
The Board takes strategic decisions .861  
The Board supervises all strategic phases .670  
 
 
Table 1 Panel B: Controls for the CEO’ self-attribution bias in assessing board task performance 
 Board Monitoring Task Board Advice Task 
CEO_tenure -.06 
(.345) 
-.01 
(.896) 
CEO_age -.06 
(.358) 
.01 
(839) 
CEO_interlocks .09 
(149) 
.11† 
(.77) 
† sig. at p<0.10; * sig. at p<0.05; ** sig. at p<0.01. 
CEO_tenure is a continuous variable that expresses the number of years the CEO has been in charge. 
CEO_age is a continuous variable that indicates the age of the CEO. CEO_interlocks is a continuous 
variable that expresses the total number of directorships held by the CEO within the relevant business 
group. 
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Table 2 : Descriptive of the Sample and Coding of Variables 
Variables Description Mean SD Median 1st 
quintile 
5th 
quintile 
N 
Size It expresses the natural logarithmic transformation of firm X Turnover in 
2001-2003 
887,965 4,915.017 175,432 9,040 3,334.574 260 
Fama It is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is family owned (1) or 
not (0) 
.52 .5 0   262 
Listeda It is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is listed (1) or not (0) .25 .43 0   264 
inst_own It indicates the percentage of shares owned by banks, mutual funds and 
venture capitalists 
6.06 .177 0 0 .18 264 
ceo_duala It is a dummy variable indicating whether the CEO is also the Chair of the 
board (1) or not (0) 
.30 .46 0   264 
bd_sizeb It expresses the number of directors appointed on the Board 7.23 3.53 6 4 10 264 
bd_outa It expresses the ratio of independent, unaffiliated and non executive 
directors on the Board 
.47 .34 .56 0 .80 264 
bd_own It indicates the ratio of directors with shares in the firm over the total 
number of directors 
.21 .32 0 0 .42 264 
bd_rega It is a dummy variable indicating whether the Board has a formal 
regulation in place (1) or not (0) 
.33 .47 0   256 
bd_meet It expresses the number of Board meetings in one year 7.04 5.39 6 3.5 10 264 
Profitb It expresses the average ROE of firm in 2001-2003 5.87 18.48 6.15 -2.27 16.68 258 
h_profit It is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm’s profitability ratio falls 
within the 1st quintile of the distribution of ROE 
29.50 13.02    258 
l_profit It is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm’s profitability ratio falls 
within the 5th quintile of the distribution of ROE 
-19.76 15.34    258 
Ind_reg It is a 5-point scale variable. 5 indicates whether the CEO considers the 
firm to be operating in a highly regulated industry. 1 indicates a firm 
operating into a non/regulated industry 
2.98 1.55    264 
h_ind_reg It is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is operating into a 
highly regulated industry (1) or not (0) 
5     264 
l_ind_reg It is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is operating into an 
unregulated industry (1) or not (0) 
1     264 
Monitor It indicates the CEO’s perception of board performing a monitoring task. 
It is computed as the mean of 3 questionnaire items. 
3.55 .99 3.66   264 
Advice It indicates the CEO’s perception of board performing an advice task. It is 
computed as the mean of 4 questionnaire items. 
3.47 .93 3.5   264 
a Indicates the variable is expressed in percentage. b Indicates the value has been windsorized at 5 and 95 percent. 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 Size - -.06 .12† .03 .01 .16* .15* -.11† -.01 .04 -.05 -.08 .05 .01 .00 .01 -.01 .01 
2 Fama -.11† - .10 .15* -.02 -.11† -.10† .44** -.17** -.12 -.02 -.09 .02 -.25** .24** -.20** .01 .14* 
3 Listeda .22** .08 - .27** .07 .38** .32** -.01 -.04 .25** -.13† -.20** .10 .07 -.05 .04 .29** .11† 
4 inst_own .01 -.03 .11† - .02 .12† .16* .02 -.06 .07 -.11† -.12† .14* -.09 -.14* .03 .04 .00 
5 ceo_duala -.01 -.01 -.06 -.04 - -.04 -.09 -.11† -.12† .12† .06 .01 -.11† .05 -.03 .06 -.05 .04 
6 bd_sizeb .22** -.15* .35** .08 -.01 - .55** -.07 -.07 .19** .06 -.18** .02 .09 -.02 .08 .23** -.01 
7 bd_outa .17** -.09 .33** .16** -.09 .57* - -.06 -.07 .20** -.13† -.13† .10† .09 -.04 .03 .16* -.10 
8 bd_own -.15* .34** -.13* -.03 -.06 -.21** -.17** - -.11† -.05 .05 .02 -.05 -.09 -.08 .06 .05 .10 
9 bd_rega .01 -.15* -.05 .05 -.11† -.02 -.07 -.07 - -.01 -.03 .06 .10† -.00 -.06 -.04 .05 .10 
10 bd_meet .09 -.11† .08 .02 .08 .08 .09 .09 .03 - -.06 -.14* -.00 .29** -.27** .21** .15* .11† 
11 Profitb -.06 -.04 -.15* -.10† .06 -.05 -.16** -.16* .00 -.05 - .61** -.71** .04 -.01 .03 -.06 -.05 
12 h_profit -.09 -.08 -.19** -.06 .01 -.18** -.15* -.15* .06 -.03 64** - -.24** .05 .02 .06 -.15** -.08 
13 l_profit .03 .02 .11† .05 -.10† .01 .08 .09 .10 -.05 -.69** -24** - -.06 -.00 -.10† .07 .02 
14 Ind_reg .15* -.22** .07 -.08 .03 .16* .10 .10 .01 .21** .08 .05 -.05 - -.79** .76** .17* .09 
15 h_ind_reg -.11† .24** -.05 -.12* -.03 -.10 -.05 .04 -.06 -.15* .01 .02 -.01 -.78** - -.38** -.05 -.02 
16 l_ind_reg .14* -.21** .03 .00 .03 .11† .04 -.05 -.02 .19** .06 .06 -.10† .73** -.35** - .20** .19** 
17 monitor .09 -.05 .28** -.03 -.07 .21** .16** .16** .07 .13* -.04 -.16** .06 .17** -.07 .18** - .46** 
18 advice .07 .11† .12† -.03 .02 -.08 -.06 -.06 .12* .10† -.04 -.10 .04 .17† -.02 .18** .51** - 
† sig. at p<0.10; * sig. at p<0.05; ** sig. at p<0.01. 
The coefficients below the diagonal report Person-product moment correlation; the coefficients above the diagonal report Spearman’s Rho correlation. Monitor and Advice are are 
computed respectively as the average value of CEOs’ responses to 3 and 4 questionnaire items. The main predictors are (i) past firm performance (profit) measured as the average ROE 
in years t-2, t-1, t; h_profit (l_profit) are dummies indicating whether the firm past profitability falls in the top (bottom) quintile of the distribution. (ii) Industry regulation is measured 
through the CEO’s assessment of the overall level of regulation in the firm’s main business; h_ind_reg (l_ind_reg) is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm operates in high 
(low) regulated sectors. Control vari ables are the following: size is the log transformation of the average turnover in t-2, t-1, t; fam is a dummy variable indicating whether one family 
holds at least 30% of shares; listed is a dummy variable indicating whether the company was consistently listed on the stock market in t-2, t-1, t; inst_own indicates the total percentage 
of shares held by banks, mutual funds and venture capitalists; CEO_dual indicates whether the CEO is also the CHAIRPERSON; bd_size expresses the total number of directors 
appointed (this variable is windsorized at 95%); bd_outs is the ratio of independent, unaffiliated and non-executive directors over the total number of directors; bd_own is the ratio of 
directors owning shares in the firm over the total number of directors; bd_reg is a dummy variable indicating whether the board has a formal regulation in place disciplining how it 
operates; bd_meet indicates the number of board meetings in the year prior to the questionnaire. 
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Table 4: The effects of past performance & industry regulation on board monitoring task. 
DV: board 
monitoring 
Model 
1 
Control 
Model 2 
Past 
Performance 
Model 3 
Industry Regulation 
Full Model 
Size -.01 
(-.26) 
-.01 
(-.36) 
-.02 
(-.61) 
-.02 
(-.64) 
Fam -.02 
(-.18) 
-.07 
(-.52) 
.03 
(.20) 
-.01 
(-.02.) 
Listed .57** 
(4.12) 
.53** 
(3.94) 
.56** 
(4.12) 
.51** 
(3.93) 
inst_own -.52 
(-1.55) 
-.53† 
(-1.70) 
-.39 
(-1.15) 
-.35 
(-1.13) 
ceo_dual -.11 
(-.87) 
-.09 
(-.72) 
-.14 
(-1.06) 
-.10 
(-.79) 
bd_size .03 
(1.57) 
.03 
(1.28) 
.03 
(1.42) 
.02 
(1.19) 
bd_out .03 
(.33) 
.11 
(.52) 
.09 
(.41) 
.12 
(.59) 
bd_own .15 
(.65) 
.25 
(1.07) 
.11 
(.49) 
.22 
(1.02) 
bd_reg .18 
(1.45) 
.17 
(1.35) 
.19 
(1.52) 
.20 
(1.59) 
bd_meet .02 
(1.45) 
.02† 
(1.76) 
.01 
(.86) 
.02 
(1.27) 
Profit  .01* 
(2.30) 
 .01* 
(2.51) 
h_profit  -.58** 
(-2.66) 
 -.61** 
(-2.80) 
l_profit  .44* 
(2.01) 
 .49* 
(2.34) 
h_ind_reg   .39** 
(2.48) 
.45** 
(2.92) 
l_ind_reg   .03 
(.23) 
.08 
(.57) 
Intercept 3.08** 
(6.98) 
3.09** 
(6.44) 
3.18** 
(7.11) 
3.08** 
(6.44) 
N 247 247 249 247 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 .124 .155 .142 .185 
F-Change 3.89** 4.04* 3.95** 4.33** 
† sig. at p<0.10; * sig. at p<0.05; ** sig. at p<0.01. Table 4 reports OLS regression coefficients and robust t-stat 
(in parenthesis). The DV is board monitoring: this is computed as the average value of CEOs’ responses to 3 
questionnaire items. The main predictors are: (i) past firm performance (profit) is the average ROE in years t-2, 
t-1, t; h_profit (l_profit) are dummies indicating whether the firm ROE falls in the top (bottom) quintile of the 
distribution. (ii) Industry regulation is the CEO’s assessment of the overall level of regulation in the firm’s main 
business; h_ind_reg (l_ind_reg) is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm operates in high (low) 
regulated sectors. Control variables are: size is the log transformation of the average turnover in t-2, t-1, t; fam is 
a dummy indicating whether one family holds at least 30% of shares; listed is a dummy indicating whether the 
company was listed on the stock market in t-2, t-1, t; inst_own indicates the total % of shares held by banks, 
mutual funds and venture capitalists; CEO_dual indicates whether the CEO is also the CHAIRPERSON; 
bd_size is the total number of directors appointed (this is windsorized at 95%); bd_outs is the ratio of 
independent and non-executive directors over the total number of directors; bd_own is the ratio of directors 
owning shares over the total number of directors; bd_reg is a dummy indicating whether the board has a formal 
regulation disciplining how it operates; bd_meet indicates the number of meetings in the year prior to the 
questionnaire.  
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Table 5: OLS Regression. The effects of past performance & industry regulation on board advice 
task 
DV: board advice Model 1 
Control 
Model 2 
Past Performance 
Model 3  
Industry Regulation 
Full Model 
Size .05 
(1.31) 
.04 
(1.21) 
.03 
(.99) 
.03 
(.88) 
Fam .19 
(1.47) 
.15 
(1.18) 
.30** 
(2.34) 
.25* 
(1.84) 
Listed .31* 
(2.63) 
.29* 
(2.42) 
.31** 
(2.62) 
.27* 
(2.25) 
inst_own -.15 
(-.43) 
-.15 
(-.43) 
.06 
(.19) 
.05 
(.15) 
ceo_dual .06 
(0.42) 
.07 
(.50) 
.02 
(.16) 
.06 
(.44) 
bd_size -.02 
(-1.31) 
-.03 
(-1.42) 
-.03† 
(-1.73) 
-.03† 
(-1.82) 
bd_out -.15 
(-.75) 
-.13 
(-.65) 
-.14 
(-.74) 
-.11 
(-.57)   
bd_own .18 
(.79) 
.23 
(.99) 
.09 
(.41) 
.21 
(.93) 
bd_reg .28* 
(2.33) 
.28* 
(2.32 ) 
.33** 
(2.73) 
.32** 
(2.63) 
bd_meet .02 
(1.62 ) 
.02† 
(1.78) 
.01 
(0.92) 
.01 
(1.07) 
Profit  .01 
(1,27) 
 .01 
(1.52) 
h_profit  -.36† 
(1.67) 
 -.39* 
(1.98) 
l_profit  .18 
(.92) 
 .24 
(1.28) 
h_ind_reg   .56** 
(3.97) 
.56** 
(4.02) 
l_ind_reg   .06 
(0.48) 
.08 
(.51) 
Intercept 2,70** 
(6.07) 
2.75** 
(6.03) 
2.72** 
(6.21)  
2.75** 
(6.14) 
N 247 247 249 247 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 .077 .089 .133 .141 
F-Change 2.68** 2.39* 4.05** 3.45** 
† sig. at p<0.10; * sig. at p<0.05; ** sig. at p<0.01. Table 4 reports OLS regression coefficients and robust 
t-stat (in parenthesis). The DV is board advice: this is computed as the average value of CEOs’ responses to 
4 questionnaire items. The main predictors are: (i) past firm performance (profit) is the average ROE in 
years t-2, t-1, t; h_profit (l_profit) are dummies indicating whether the firm ROE falls in the top (bottom) 
quintile of the distribution. (ii) Industry regulation is the CEO’s assessment of the overall level of 
regulation in the firm’s main business; h_ind_reg (l_ind_reg) is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
firm operates in high (low) regulated sectors. Control variables are: size is the log transformation of the 
average turnover in t-2, t-1, t; fam is a dummy indicating whether one family holds at least 30% of shares; 
listed is a dummy indicating whether the company was listed on the stock market in t-2, t-1, t; inst_own 
indicates the total % of shares held by banks, mutual funds and venture capitalists; CEO_dual indicates 
whether the CEO is also the CHAIRPERSON; bd_size is the total number of directors appointed (this is 
windsorized at 95%); bd_outs is the ratio of independent and non-executive directors over the total number 
of directors; bd_own is the ratio of directors owning shares over the total number of directors; bd_reg is a 
dummy indicating whether the board has a formal regulation disciplining how it operates; bd_meet 
indicates the number of meetings in the year prior to the questionnaire. 
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Table 6: Robustness checks using alternative specifications for Past Firm Performance 
 Past Performance: ROE Past Performance: ROS Past Performance: ROI 
 Board 
monitoring 
Board 
Advice 
Board 
monitoring 
Board 
Advice 
Board 
monitoring 
Board 
Advice 
ROE2001-2003 .01* 
(2.51) 
.01 
(1.52) 
    
H_perf(ROE) -.61** 
(-2.80) 
-.39* 
(1.98) 
    
L_perf(ROE) .49* 
(2.34) 
.24 
(1.28) 
    
H_ind_reg .45* 
(2.34) 
.56** 
(4.02) 
    
L_ind_reg .08 
(.57) 
.08 
(.51) 
    
ROS2001-2003   .03 
(2.06) 
.02 
(1.04) 
  
H_perf(ROS)   -.16 
(-.72) 
-.07 
(-.31) 
  
L_perf(ROS)   .34* 
(1.78) 
.01 
(.07) 
  
H_ind_reg   .38* 
(2.34) 
.56** 
(3.86) 
  
L_ind_reg   .01 
(.01) 
.06 
(.43) 
  
ROI2001-2003     .01 
(.62) 
-.01 
(-.69) 
H_perf(ROI)     -.17 
(-.101) 
-.10 
(-.59) 
L_perf(ROI)     -.07 
(-.44) 
-.26† 
(-1.84) 
H_ind_reg     .39* 
(2.41) 
.54** 
(3.85) 
L_ind_reg     .04 
(.27) 
.08 
(.57) 
† sig. at p<0.10; * sig. at p<0.05; ** sig. at p<0.01. Table 6 provides results from robustness checks 
performed when using alternative specifications to the Return on Equity (ROE) as a proxy for past 
firm performance. Return on Sales (ROS) is the average value of ROS for any given firm in 2001, 
2002, 2003. ROS is computed as the Net Income from Operations scaled by Total Sales at the 
beginning of the year. Return on Investment (ROI) is the average value of ROI for any given firm in 
2001, 2002, 2003. ROI is computed as the Net Income from Operations scaled by Total Investment 
(Long Term + Short Term Asset). 
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Table	7:	OLS	Regression	(‘full	model’	only)	on	a	subsample	of	Listed	Firms	
	 Listed	Firms	(N=65) Full	Sample	(N=264)	
	 Board	
Monitoring		
Board	
Advice		
Board	
Monitoring		
Board		
Advice		
Size	 .12*	
(2.44)	
.09
(1.65)	
-.02 
(-.64)	
.03 
(.88)	
Fam	 .24	
(1.11)	
.48*
(2.52)	
-.01 
(-.02.)	
.25* 
(1.84)	
Listed	 	 .51** 
(3.93)	
.27* 
(2.25)	
inst_own	 ‐.83*	
(2.15)	
‐.64†
(‐1.69)	
-.35 
(-1.13)	
.05 
(.15)	
ceo_dual	 .07	
(.40)	
.10
(.52)	
-.10 
(-.79)	
.06 
(.44)	
bd_size	 ‐.02	
(‐.96)	
‐.05
(‐1.33)	
.02 
(1.19)	
-.03† 
(-1.82)	
bd_out	 .26	
(.63)	
‐.36
(‐.89)	
.12 
(.59)	
-.11 
(-.57)	
bd_own	 1.27**	
(2.69)	
.12
(.21)	
.22 
(1.02)	
.21 
(.93)	
bd_reg	 ‐.06	
(‐.36)	
.31†
(1.70)	
.20 
(1.59)	
.32** 
(2.63)	
bd_meet	 .35	
(‐1.19)	
‐.01
(‐.36)	
.02 
(1.27)	
.01 
(1.07)	
Profit	 .02**	
(3.29)	
.01
(.58)	
.01* 
(2.51)	
.01 
(1.52)	
h_profit	 ‐1.18**	
(‐2.70)	
‐.07
(‐.18)	
-.61** 
(-2.80)	
-.39* 
(1.98)	
l_profit	 .94**	
(4.11)	
.05
(.15)	
.49* 
(2.34)	
.24 
(1.28)	
h_ind_reg	 .46†	
(1.66)	
.44†
(1.73)	
.45** 
(2.92)	
.56** 
(4.02)	
l_ind_reg	 .51**	
(2.74)	
.22
(1.22)	
.08 
(.57)	
.08 
(.51)	
Intercept	 1.56*	
(2.68)	
2.65**
(3.83)	
3.08** 
(6.44)	
2.75** 
(6.14)	
N 65	 65 247 247	
Industry Dummies Yes	 Yes Yes Yes	
R2 .456	 .277 .185 .141	
F-Change 7.15**	 1.74** 4.33** 3.45**	
† sig. at p<0.10; * sig. at p<0.05; ** sig. at p<0.01. Table 7 provides OLS regression results for the subsample of 
listed firms only. Table 4 reports OLS regression coefficients and robust t-stat (in parenthesis). The DVs are board 
monitoring (advice) computed as the average value of CEOs’ responses to 3 (4) questionnaire items. The main 
predictors are: (i) past firm performance (profit) is the average ROE in years t-2, t-1, t; h_profit (l_profit) are 
dummies indicating whether the firm ROE falls in the top (bottom) quintile of the distribution. (ii) Industry 
regulation is the CEO’s assessment of the overall level of regulation in the firm’s main business; h_ind_reg 
(l_ind_reg) is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm operates in high (low) regulated sectors. Control 
variables are: size is the log transformation of the average turnover in t-2, t-1, t; fam is a dummy indicating whether 
one family holds at least 30% of shares; listed is a dummy indicating whether the company was listed on the stock 
market in t-2, t-1, t; inst_own indicates the total % of shares held by banks, mutual funds and venture capitalists; 
CEO_dual indicates whether the CEO is also the CHAIRPERSON; bd_size is the total number of directors 
appointed (this is windsorized at 95%); bd_outs is the ratio of independent and non-executive directors over the total 
number of directors; bd_own is the ratio of directors owning shares over the total number of directors; bd_reg is a 
dummy indicating whether the board has a formal regulation disciplining how it operates; bd_meet indicates the 
number of meetings in the year prior to the questionnaire.
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